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Judicial Independence Revisited 
Lori Sterling and Sean Hanley 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 22, 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a unanimous 
decision in four consolidated appeals dealing with the appropriate 
process for setting judicial compensation.1 In so doing, it revised the 
minimum constitutional requirements of judicial financial security that 
had been previously addressed in its 1997 decision in the Provincial 
Judges Reference,2 and confirmed the need for curial deference to 
government decisions on judicial compensation. 
Shortly after the 1997 decision, a number of judicial compensation 
commissions had recommended substantial salary increases. These 
increases were generally based on the increase in duties of provincial 
court judges, a desire to narrow the salary differential with federal 
superior court judges and growth in the economy.3 Governments did not 
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Canada (Provincial Court Judges Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minster of Justice); 
Ontario Judges Assn. v. Ontario (Management Board); Bodner v. Alberta; Conférence des juges du 
Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General; Minc v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 47, 
2005 SCC 44 [hereinafter “Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals”]. The opinions expressed 
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1
 In terms of the timing of the decision, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision followed shortly after the Court’s decision in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 a controversial, split-court decision respecting 
the rights of persons to access private health care services when faced with excessive wait times for 
public services.  
2
 Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island; 
Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward 
Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. 
Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Provincial 
Judges Reference”]. 
3
 In particular, federal superior court judges received substantial increases in 
compensation. As provincial court judges argued for narrowing the gap with federal superior court 
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typically accept all of the recommendations and the judicial associations 
sought judicial review.  
In an unusually frank decision, the Supreme Court of Canada stated 
that it had hoped that the requirement of the commission process set out 
in 1997 in the Provincial Judges Reference would ensure the de-
politicization of decisions respecting judicial compensation but that 
“instead of diminishing friction between judges and government, the 
result has been to exacerbate it”. The Court also stated that it intended in 
its decision to clarify the principles of the compensation commission 
process in order to avoid a continuation of these conflicts in the future.4  
The Court confirmed that the compensation commission is essential 
to the determination of both provincial court judges’ and justices of the 
peace’s financial security. Nevertheless, the commission process is 
recommendatory and not binding on government. The government must 
seriously consider the recommendations but need not follow them.  
The Court also dealt specifically with the standard of review for 
decisions on compensation, and set a very high threshold of deference to 
the government’s decision. In so doing, the Court signalled that it would 
not overturn government decisions except in rare circumstances. 
In this paper, we examine whether the Court’s stated goal of 
limiting future litigation will be achieved. We conclude that indeed 
litigation respecting judicial compensation is likely to be curbed in the 
near future. Nevertheless the commission process will remain robust and 
there is even likely to be increased emphasis on the evidence and 
submissions presented by the parties to the commission.  
The Supreme Court decision also leaves some important questions 
unanswered. In reaffirming the commission process as integral to the 
determination of judicial compensation, the decision provides little 
incentive for the development of any less adversarial relationship 
between government and the judiciary, comparable to that which arises 
in traditional labour relations. While some precedents for consensus 
building exist, the Supreme Court does not indicate in this decision how 
receptive it would be to a relationship developing between the judiciary 
and government that involves consultations and discussions concerning 
compensation.  
                                                                                                            
judges and federal superior court judges argued for further salary increases following each increase 
for provincial judges, the two groups’ compensation continued to be “ratcheted” upward.  
4
 Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, [2005] S.C.J. No. 47, 2005 SCC 44, at paras. 
11-12. 
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As well, the Court decision leaves open the question of how the 
judicial independence requirements will be applied to other decision-
makers in the judicial system apart from provincial judges and justices 
of the peace. The decision does not address the application of the 
constitutional financial security principles to traffic commissioners, 
deputy judges, masters, or other decision-making bodies associated with 
the courts. 
II. FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLES  
There are three core components of judicial independence: financial 
security, security of tenure and administrative independence. Each of 
these components consists of minimum guarantees that must be in place 
to ensure the independence of judges and courts.5 
The basic minimum protections required to ensure judicial financial 
security, prior to the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference, were that (i) 
salaries be established by law; and (ii) that there be an absence of direct 
salary negotiations.6 Judicial independence could also be impaired if 
there were the appearance of salary manipulation motivated by an 
improper or colourable purpose, or discriminatory treatment of judges.7 
The Provincial Judges Reference added the requirement that judicial 
salaries not be increased, decreased or frozen without an inquiry and 
non-binding recommendation by an independent, objective and effective 
compensation commission process.8 
The basic requirement of security of tenure is that judges be 
appointed until an age of retirement, for a fixed term, or for a specific 
adjudicative task, and that their tenure be secure against arbitrary or 
discretionary interference by the Executive or other appointing 
authority.9 Courts have applied particular requirements flexibly to 
different types of decision makers.10 For instance, superior court judges’ 
appointments apply constitutionally until age 75 and they may only be 
                                                                                                            
5
 R. v. Valente, [1985] S.C.J. No. 77, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, at 694, 704, 706 S.C.R.; 
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 115. 
6
 Valente, id., at 704-706. 
7
 Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] S.C.J. No. 50, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, at 77. 
8
 Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 147. 
9
 Valente, supra, note 5, at 694-95 S.C.R. 
10
 R. v. Généreux, [1992] S.C.J. No. 10, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, at 285 S.C.R.; Ell v. Alberta, 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 35, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857, at para. 31; R. v. Lippé, [1990] S.C.J. No. 128, [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 114, at 142 S.C.R.; Re Therrien, [2001] S.C.J. No. 36, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 65-67. 
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removed from office on the joint address of Parliament and the Senate.11 
The guarantee of security of tenure also requires that provincial court 
judges only be removed from office for cause related to capacity to 
perform judicial functions, and there be a judicial inquiry to establish 
that such cause exists, at which the judge must be given an opportunity 
to be heard.12  
The basic requirement of administrative independence is control by 
the courts “over the administrative decisions that bear directly and 
immediately on the exercise of the judicial function”. These were 
defined in what the Court has described as “narrow terms” consisting of 
the “assignment of judges, sittings of the court, and court lists — as well 
as the related matters of allocation of court rooms and direction of the 
administrative staff engaged in carrying out these functions...”.13 
III. THE 1997 PROVINCIAL JUDGES REFERENCE 
The 1997 Provincial Judges Reference was a landmark decision in two 
respects. First, the Court expressly recognized “unwritten constitutional 
principles” as a legitimate source for constitutional rules.14 In addition, it 
held that the Constitution commission process was necessary for 
inquiring into and making recommendations on the appropriate level of 
judicial compensation.15 
1. New Constitutional Sources — Unwritten Constitutional 
Principles 
Prior to the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference, the Canadian 
Constitution was considered to derive almost exclusively from the 
                                                                                                            
11
 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App II,  
No. 5, s. 99. 
12
 Valente, supra, note 5, at 697-98; Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 
115; Re Therrien, supra, note 10, at para. 39; Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, supra, 
note 4, at para. 40; The federal Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1, s. 64, establishes similar 
requirements for federally appointed judges (see also Cosgrove v. Canadian Judicial Council, 
[2005] F.C.J. No. 1748, under appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal). 
13
 Valente, supra, note 5, at 709, 712 S.C.R.; Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, 
at para. 117. 
14
 Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 82-109. See also Chief Justice 
Beverley McLachlin, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is Going On?”, Remarks given at 
the 2005 Lord Cooke Lecture, Wellington, New Zealand, at 19, 27. 
15
 Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 166-85. 
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Constitution’s text.16 Adopting a novel approach, Lamer C.J. held, for 
the majority, that the Canadian Constitution includes not only text but 
also unwritten principles, which derive from the Preamble to the 
Constitution Act, 1867. The requirement of judicial independence was 
described as “at root an unwritten constitutional principle” and “[t]he 
specific provisions of the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982, merely 
‘elaborate that principle in the institutional apparatus which they create 
or contemplate’”.17 This reasoning extends judicial independence 
principles from their previously understood application to superior and 
provincial courts to apply to “all courts no matter what kind of cases 
they hear”.18  
The 1997 Provincial Judges Reference was decided under section 
11(d) of the Charter and the majority’s comments on unwritten 
constitutional principles were obiter dicta. While these principles have 
been referred to in subsequent cases, their significance has been limited. 
More recently, it has been confirmed that they do not afford greater 
protection than that guaranteed by the Constitution’s text.19 The 
Supreme Court has also refrained from using unwritten principles to 
strike down legislation,20 and recently granted leave to appeal from a 
British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in which the majority 
declared legislation to be unconstitutional because it offended the “rule 
of law” principle.21 In the past, the Supreme Court of Canada has denied 
leave to appeal from decisions refusing to invalidate legislation on the 
                                                                                                            
16
 A partial exception was the “implied bill of rights” theory, which according to some 
members of the Court, restricted the ability of the legislatures to limit individual expression. 
However, this approach to constitutional interpretation had not previously been expressly adopted 
by a majority of the Court (see Reference re Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.R. 100, at 133-34 (per 
Duff C.J.) and at 146 (per Cannon J.), affd [1938] 4 D.L.R. 433 (P.C.); Saumur v. Quebec (City), 
[1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 330-31 (per Rand J.) and at 354-56 (per Kellock J.); Switzman v. Ebling, 
[1957] S.C.R. 285, at 307 (per Rand J.) and at 328 (per Abbott J.); OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney 
General), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 57 (per Beetz J.).  
17
 Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 83, 106-107. 
18
 Id., at para. 107. 
19
 Re Therrien, supra, note 10, at para. 68. 
20
 Babcock v. Canada Attorney General, [2002] S.C.J. No. 58, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 
54-57; British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 
473, at paras. 61-68. 
21
 Christie v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2005] B.C.J. No. 2745, 48 B.C.L.R. 
(4th) 267, at para. 76 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 59. 
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basis of unwritten principles,22 and provincial courts of appeal have 
otherwise not gone further than to apply unwritten principles in 
reviewing discretionary decision-making.23 While not reversing itself, 
the Supreme Court has now signalled that the possibility of a new 
constitutional right emanating from the preamble, is much diminished. 
2. The Commission Process 
The Provincial Judges Reference also established for the first time the 
constitutional requirement of judicial compensation commissions with a 
mandate to review and make recommendations on provincial judges’ 
compensation every three to five years. The role of these commissions 
was to “depoliticize” the relationship between judges and governments 
to ensure that the setting of judicial compensation was based on 
objective considerations.24 
The Court emphasized that compensation commissions were to be 
“independent, objective and effective”. By “independent”, the Court 
meant that they should have members chosen by both the government 
and the judiciary. Members must also have security of tenure in that 
they serve for a fixed term.25 
By “objective” the Court meant that the commissions “must make 
recommendations on judges’ remuneration by reference to objective 
criteria, not political expediencies”. The Court stated that objectivity 
could be achieved by having the commission hear submissions from the 
provincial judges associations and the government, though this process 
was not constitutionally required. The Court also recommended, but did 
not require, that objectivity be promoted by including in the 
commission’s enabling legislation or regulation a list of relevant factors 
to guide the commission’s deliberations.26 
                                                                                                            
22
 Bacon v. Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp., [1999] S.J. No. 302, 180 Sask. R. 20, at 
paras. 29-30 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 437; Singh v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2000] F.C.J. No. 4, [2000] 3 F.C. 185, at para. 36 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. 
refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 92; New York Life Insurance Co. c. Vaughan, [2003] J.Q. no 89 (C.A.), 
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2002] C.S.C.R. No. 470; Baie D’Urfé (Ville) c. Québec (Procureur 
général), [2001] J.Q. no 4821 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2001] C.S.C.R. 524. 
23
 Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé), [2001] O.J. 
No. 4767, 56 O.R. (3d) 505 (C.A.).  
24
 Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 147. 
25
 Id., at paras. 171-72. 
26
 Id., at para. 173. 
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Finally, commissions must be “effective”. The Court emphasized 
that this did not mean that their recommendations were binding. The 
commission process must, however, “have a meaningful effect on the 
determination of judicial salaries”. This requires, as a minimum 
constitutional standard, that the government formally respond to the 
commission’s recommendations and provide reasons for any decision 
not to implement a particular recommendation.27  
A government’s reasons for not accepting a commission 
recommendation are subject to judicial review on a standard of “simple 
rationality”. Chief Justice Lamer emphasized that “[a] reviewing court 
does not engage in a searching analysis of the relationship between ends 
and means, which is the hallmark of a s. 1 analysis”. Rather, the 
standard of simple rationality is described as follows:  
First, it screens out decisions with respect to judicial remuneration 
which are based on purely political considerations, or which are 
enacted for discriminatory reasons. Changes to or freezes in 
remuneration can only be justified for reasons which relate to the 
public interest, broadly understood. Second, if judicial review is 
sought, a reviewing court must inquire into the reasonableness of the 
factual foundation of the claim made by the government, similar to the 
way that we have evaluated whether there was an economic 
emergency in Canada in our jurisprudence under the division of 
powers (Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373).28  
3. Dissenting Opinion 
The 1997 Court decision was not unanimous. In his dissenting reasons, 
La Forest J. criticized the majority’s decision to make novel 
pronouncements on the source of constitutional principles and the 
requirement of a judicial compensation commission, without the benefit 
of full argument. Justice La Forest also questioned the appropriateness 
of the Court making such far-reaching conclusions that were not 
necessary to determine the case before it on “an issue on which judges 
can hardly be seen to be indifferent, especially as it concerns their own 
remuneration”.29  
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 Id., at paras. 174-80. 
28
 Id., at para. 183. 
29
 Id., at para. 302, La Forest J. (dissenting). 
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Justice La Forest disagreed with the majority’s view that unwritten 
constitutional principles provided limitations on the power of legislatures 
to interfere with judicial independence.30 In his opinion, judicial review of 
legislative actions derives its legitimacy from textual constitutional limits 
on legislative power and changes to these constitutionally entrenched 
principles should arise through constitutional amendment, not resort to 
underlying unwritten principles.31 
Justice La Forest also rejected the notion that changes to judicial 
compensation would necessarily interfere with judicial independence if 
they were not the product of a judicial compensation commission 
inquiry and recommendation. In particular, he was of the view that the 
decrease to judicial salaries before the Court in the Provincial Judges 
Reference, which were part of an overall economic measure affecting 
substantially all persons paid from public funds, would not cause a 
reasonable person to perceive that the independence or impartiality of 
judges had been compromised.32 
IV. THE 2005 PROVINCIAL JUDGES COMPENSATION APPEALS 
1. Decisions of Appellate Courts 
Since the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference, governments have frequently 
rejected judicial compensation commissions’ recommendations . 
Associations representing the judiciary have consistently challenged these 
decisions and courts, with few exceptions, have overturned the 
governments’ decisions on judicial review. In various provinces, superior 
and/or appellate courts that reviewed government reasons either applied 
the simple rationality standard with heightened rigour33 or departed from 
                                                                                                            
30
 Id., at para. 304, La Forest J. (dissenting). 
31
 Id., at para. 314, La Forest J. (dissenting). 
32
 Id., at para. 337, La Forest J. (dissenting). 
33
 Alberta Provincial Judges Assn. v. Alberta, [1999] A.J. No. 863, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 418, 
at paras. 35-40 (C.A.); Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick 
(Minister of Justice), [2003] N.B.J. No. 321, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 38, at para. 123 (C.A.); Conférence 
des juges du Québec v. Québec (Attorney General), [2004] J.Q. No. 6622, [2004] R.J.Q. 1450, at 
paras. 47, 50-52 (C.A.); Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice), 
[2001] M.J. No. 339, 202 D.L.R. (4th) 698, at paras. 42-43 (Q.B.); Newfoundland Assn. of 
Provincial Court Judges v. Newfoundland, [2000] N.J. No. 258, 191 D.L.R. (4th) 225, at para. 95 
(C.A.); Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [1998] B.C.J. No. 1230, 160 D.L.R. (4th) 477, at paras. 28-29 (C.A.), leave to appeal to 
S.C.C. refused [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 401. 
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the Provincial Judges Reference to create new, exacting standards for 
governments to meet.34  
The majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Bodner v. Alberta is 
an example of courts imposing new standards. Justice Paperny, for the 
majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal, stated that a government must 
demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” before departing from a 
commission recommendation and that on judicial review “a court must 
conduct a thorough and searching examination of the reasons 
proffered”.35 
The Alberta Court of Appeal’s description of the standard of review 
stands in contrast to the majority approach in the Provincial Judges 
Reference. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada had held that a 
reviewing court “does not engage in a searching analysis of the 
relationship between ends and means, which is the hallmark of a s. 1 
analysis”.36 Further, the Alberta Court of Appeal’s requirement of 
“extraordinary circumstances” elevated the compensation commission’s 
role from that of a consultative body to a decision-making body whose 
recommendations could rarely be rejected.  
The Quebec and New Brunswick Courts of Appeal are examples of 
Courts that purported to apply the simple rationality standard of review 
but did so with heightened rigour. Both appellate courts disagreed with 
the Alberta Court of Appeal’s description of the standard of review as 
“searching” and requiring extraordinary circumstances. Nevertheless, 
both of these courts in practice subjected the decisions of their 
respective provincial governments to exacting scrutiny.37 
The Ontario courts, by contrast, adopted a deferential approach that 
was based on the Court’s articulation of the standard of review in the 
1997 Provincial Judges Reference. Of the four provincial appellate 
courts whose decisions were appealed from, the Ontario Court of 
                                                                                                            
34
 Bodner v. Alberta, [2002] A.J. No. 1428, 222 D.L.R. (4th) 284, at para. 130 (C.A.), revd 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 47; La Conférence des Juges du Québec v. Québec (Procureure Générale), 
[2000] J.Q. no 3772, 196 D.L.R. (4th) 533, at para. 42 (C.A.); see also comments of MacCallum J. 
in Alberta Provincial Judges’ Assn. v. Alberta, [2004] A.J. No. 936, 41 Alta. L.R. (4th) 153, at 
paras. 111-18 (Q.B.). 
35
 Bodner, id., at para. 108. 
36
 Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 183. 
37
 Provincial Court Judges Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick, supra, note 33, at 
paras. 110, 123; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Conférence des juges du Québec, supra, note 33, at 
paras. 28, 47, 50-52. 
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Appeal’s approach was most consistent with the revised standard of 
review ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada.38  
In Ontario, the Judicial Remuneration Commission is statutorily 
empowered to issue binding recommendations on salary and most 
benefits. Recommendations on pensions, however, are not binding and 
are subject to the requirement that the government give rational reasons 
before departing from the recommendations. The Ontario government 
implemented the recommendations of the Judicial Remuneration 
Commission issued in 1999, which included a 28 per cent salary 
increase, but chose not to accept recommendations for reformulating the 
judges’ pension plan.  
The Judges’ Associations’ application for judicial review of the 
decision to reject the pension enhancements was dismissed. On appeal, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with the Alberta Court 
of Appeal’s characterization of the standard of simple rationality in 
Bodner. The Ontario Court of Appeal explained that the simple 
rationality standard called only for “a cautious and modest review”: 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the juxtaposition chosen by Lamer 
C.J.C. is one between the strictest (s. 1 of the Charter, especially as 
represented by its original formulation in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 
103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200) and the most deferential (declaration of 
economic emergency in a distribution of powers context) standards of 
review in the history of Canadian constitutional law. The former is 
truly rigorous, as it should be given that the context is a government’s 
attempt to justify a continuation of its infringement of a constitutional 
right protected by the Charter. The latter is truly deferential, as it 
should be given that the context is a government’s attempt to deal with 
a matter concerning “social and economic policy and hence 
governmental and legislative judgment” (Reference re Anti-Inflation 
Act (Canada), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452, at pp. 422-24 
S.C.R., pp. 495-96 D.L.R.).39 
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 Ontario Judges’ Assn. v. Ontario (Management Board), [2005] S.C.J. No. 47, at para. 
165, affg [2003] O.J. No. 4155, 67 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.), affg [2002] O.J. No. 533, 58 O.R. (3d) 
186 (Div. Ct.). 
39
 Ontario Judges Assn., id., at para. 65. 
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2. Elaboration of the Financial Security Requirements of the 2005 
Provincial Judges Reference 
(a) Commission Recommendations are Non-Binding 
In its decision on the consolidated appeals from Ontario, Quebec, New 
Brunswick and Alberta, the Court strongly affirmed the remuneration or 
compensation commission process as a constitutional imperative. The 
purpose of the commission was to hear evidence and submissions and 
make recommendations to government. Unless the legislature provides 
that the report is binding, the government retains the power to depart 
from the commission’s recommendations, as long as it justifies its 
decision with rational reasons.40 
(b) Reasons for Rejection to be Provided by Government 
The Court also affirmed the necessity of a government response to the 
recommendations and elaborated on the nature of the reasons required 
of government. First, the government must act in good faith and its 
responses must be “legitimate”. The Court’s discussion of the 
requirements of legitimacy indicates that the reasons must: 
• state in what respect and to what extent they depart from the 
recommendations, articulating the grounds for rejection or variation; 
• deal with the commission’s recommendations in a meaningful way 
and show that the commission’s recommendations have been taken 
into account;  
• be based on facts and sound reasoning;  
• be compatible with the common law and the Constitution;  
• include consideration of the judicial office and an intention to deal 
with it appropriately;  
• preclude any suggestion of attempting to manipulate the judiciary; 
and 
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 Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, supra, note 4, at paras. 19-21. 
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• reflect the underlying public interest in having a commission 
process, being the depoliticization of the remuneration process and 
the need to preserve judicial independence.41 
The reasons must also be based on a “reasonable factual 
foundation”. That factual foundation ought to be explicit, and should not 
be based on facts that could have been put before the Commission but 
were not.42 Importantly, however, the response can properly include new 
facts or circumstances arising after the release of the recommendations. 
The reasons can also be based on facts relating to verification of the 
accuracy of the information in the commission report.43 
What is clear from the Court’s discussion about the reasons is that 
the Court is not interested in parsing every detail of the government’s 
response. Instead, the government response must simply be in good faith 
and based on a reasonable factual foundation.  
(c) Judicial Review of Decisions on Judicial Compensation 
(i) Evidence Admissible on Judicial Review 
In both Ontario and New Brunswick, the Court admitted affidavit 
evidence filed by the provincial governments to support their reasons for 
rejecting the commission’s recommendation.44 In Ontario, the affidavit 
was provided by an actuary who was retained to analyze and calculate 
the costs of the Commission’s pension recommendations in light of the 
Commission’s binding salary increase. This evidence explained and 
expanded on the factual foundation supporting the government’s 
reasons. 
In New Brunswick, the government filed actuarial evidence similar 
to that filed in Ontario. In addition, the government filed three affidavits 
from civil servants that set out internal estimations of the cost of the 
Commission’s recommendations, economic conditions in the province 
and salary increases within the civil service.45  
The Court held that all of the affidavits filed in the Ontario and New 
Brunswick proceedings were admissible. The Court confirmed that 
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 Id., at paras. 22-27. 
42
 Id., at paras. 36, 62, 103. 
43
 Id., at paras. 26-27. 
44
 Id., at paras. 64, 103. 
45
 Id., at para. 60. 
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governments would not be permitted to adduce new facts that could 
have been advanced before the commission at the time of its inquiry, but 
were not. It is appropriate, however, for governments to provide added 
detail of the economic and actuarial information on which it relied in 
reaching the decision. In the Court’s view, the affidavits filed by both 
New Brunswick and Ontario did not advance new arguments, which 
ought to have been made before the Commission. They simply provided 
specifics of the factual foundation relied upon by the government and 
demonstrated the governments’ good faith in taking the recommendat-
ions seriously.46  
(ii) Standard of Review 
While much of the 2005 decision can be said to be merely a 
confirmation of the earlier approach, the articulation of the standard of 
judicial review does constitute a reformulation or, at the very least, a 
clarification. Specifically, the Court added a third component to the two-
stage analysis required in the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference.47 
Previously, the reviewing court had to ask whether the government: (i) 
articulated a legitimate reason for departing from the commission’s 
recommendations; and (ii) whether its decision relies on a reasonable 
factual foundation.48 Now, the reviewing court must also ask whether: 
Viewed globally, has the commission process been respected and have 
the purposes of the commission — preserving judicial independence 
and depoliticizing the setting of judicial remuneration — been 
achieved?49  
This new criterion appears to set a significantly higher threshold 
since it allows for the government to make some mistakes, provided it 
engages in the process in good faith.50 The reviewing court need only 
assess broadly whether the process, as a whole, suggests a failure to 
engage in an objective determination of the appropriate level of judicial 
compensation such that a reasonable person would perceive an 
interference with judicial independence. Minor errors or omissions 
would not be a basis for judicial review. 
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(d) Application of Principles in the Four Appeals 
The Court upheld the decisions of the Governments of Alberta, Ontario 
and New Brunswick not to accept the recommendations of the judicial 
remuneration commissions in those provinces. The decision of the 
Quebec government was rejected as failing to meet the standard of 
simple rationality. 
The Court accepted a broad range of reasons for rejecting 
commission recommendations, provided they were responsive to the 
commission recommendations and related either to the appropriate level 
of judicial compensation, or to the appropriate factors to take into 
account in determining compensation levels. In the appeals, the Court 
accepted the following government considerations in rejecting 
commission recommendations: 
• comparisons with public sector compensation, private lawyers, other 
provincial court judges and federal superior court judges; 
• provincial economic conditions; 
• past compensation increases; and 
• factual errors in the commission’s report.51 
The Court also confirmed that it was inappropriate for commissions 
to base their recommendations on any one aspect of compensation in 
isolation. For instance, the Court confirmed that it was inappropriate to 
simply set provincial judges’ salaries at a percentage (e.g., 85 per cent) 
of superior judges’ salaries without consideration of other relevant 
factors.52 The Court also confirmed the failure of the Ontario 
Commission to take into account the salary increase (on its own and its 
impact on pensions) when making recommendations to improve the 
pension plan.53 
While the Court accepted most of the reasons advanced by the 
governments involved in the appeals, it did not accept all of them. It 
rejected as illegitimate the reason advanced by New Brunswick that the 
commission recommendations should only focus on the “minimum” 
salary required to guarantee judicial independence.54 The Court also 
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rejected the reason advanced by Quebec that the Commission could only 
make recommendations to adjust compensation from the Commission’s 
previous report. The Court also criticized Quebec for focusing on the 
impact that the Commission’s recommendations would have on the 
overall labour relations policy in Quebec’s public sector, without being 
responsive to the Commission’s reasons for recommending changes to 
judicial compensation.55  
With respect to the new and last part of the test, the Court held that 
the decisions of the Governments of Alberta, Ontario and New 
Brunswick, viewed globally and with deference, reflected respect for the 
commission process and the purposes of preserving judicial 
independence and depoliticizing the setting of judicial remuneration. 
While some of New Brunswick’s reasons were described as 
“unsatisfactory”, the Court found that on balance “the response shows 
that the Government took the process seriously”.56 By contrast, the 
Court concluded that the Quebec government failed “to consider what 
should be the appropriate level of compensation for judges, as its 
primary concerns were to avoid raising expectations in other parts of the 
public sector and to safeguard the traditional structure of its pay 
scales”.57  
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF COURT’S DECISION 
1. Impact on Future Litigation 
In this paper, we have suggested that the Court’s desire to reduce 
litigation over judicial compensation may well bear fruit. This is based 
on three aspects of the Court’s decision: the standard of review, the 
remedy available to the judiciary even if it is successful on judicial 
review and the potential for the losing party to pay for the costs of 
litigation. 
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(a) A Deferential Standard of Review 
In its decision, the Court rejected arguments by judicial associations that 
either commission recommendations should be binding or the standard 
of review should be far more onerous.  
While these arguments may have led to reduced litigation, they did 
have drawbacks. First, making the commission’s recommendations 
binding would limit the provincial legislative power over provincial 
spending. The question of appropriate compensation for persons paid 
from the public purse depends on an assessment of complex social and 
economic facts. Courts have historically shown deference in reviewing 
public policy decisions that involve the weighing of competing social 
and economic evidence and legislative judgment.58  
A more onerous standard of review such as correctness might also 
have drawn the reviewing courts into substantive arguments about the 
appropriate level of judicial compensation as they examined reasons for 
government decisions on compensation levels in detail. The commission 
process articulated in the Provincial Judges Reference requires that 
different levels of the judiciary play the role of applicant and decision-
maker in proceedings respecting judicial compensation. The Supreme 
Court does not refer to this consideration overtly. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal, however, noted that while judges could be expected not to 
allow personal financial gain any bearing on their decision in a 
particular case, a heightened level of scrutiny in decisions respecting 
judicial compensation could well raise questions about the perception of 
a lack of impartiality.59  
Another factor that might have led the Court to reject a more 
onerous standard of review is the current level of compensation enjoyed 
by provincial court judges. Although governments in many provinces 
had rejected part or all of judicial compensation commission 
recommendations, the increases that were implemented were very 
substantial. Evidence filed in the four appeals before the Court showed 
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that salaries had nevertheless increased by approximately 36.6 per cent 
for Quebec judges,60 50.9 per cent for New Brunswick judges,61 57.7 per 
cent for Ontario judges62 and from 54.5 per cent to 134 per cent for 
Alberta justices of the peace.63 These facts countered any potential 
concern that governments’ rejection of various commission decisions 
had rendered the commission process ineffective.  
(b) Remedial Deference 
The Court’s disposition of remedial questions also serves to dissuade 
litigation. The Court held that if a constitutional defect is found to lie with 
the government’s decision, then the matter should be returned to the 
government for reconsideration in light of the Court’s reasons, as was 
done in Quebec.64 Alternatively, if the defect lies in the commission 
process or recommendations, then it may be appropriate to direct the 
commission to reconsider the matter and provide a new recommendation 
to government. The Court emphasized that it is “not appropriate for this 
Court to dictate the approach that should be taken in order to rectify the 
situation. Since there is more than one way to do so, it is the 
government’s task to determine which approach it prefers.”65  
The effect of the decision on remedy is that judicial associations 
will generally not be able to use judicial review as a way to have a 
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compensation commission’s recommendations implemented.66 The more 
likely remedy would be reconsideration by government or a new, non-
binding commission recommendation. In either event, the outcome 
would be unpredictable and may not result in a commission’s 
recommendations being implemented. 
(c) Normal Costs Rules Apply  
Finally, the Court’s decision on costs is also likely to reduce the 
frequency of litigation over government decisions on judicial 
compensation. The Court held that the Alberta Court of Appeal and 
Court of Queen’s Bench erred in awarding solicitor client costs against 
the province absent reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous conduct. 
The Court also confirmed its earlier pronouncement in Mackin67 that 
while the protection of judicial independence is a noble objective, that 
on its own it is not sufficient to warrant an award of solicitor-client 
costs.68 The Court awarded costs to Ontario and other provinces that 
were successful in the litigation.69 
The Court’s handling of costs makes clear that judicial associations 
will not receive preferable treatment in comparison with other litigants. 
This provides additional incentive for the judicial associations to 
exercise discipline in deciding whether to apply for judicial review of 
government decisions respecting commission reports. 
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2. Other Impacts of Decision 
Although litigation may be diminished as a result of this decision, the 
commission process is clearly entrenched. The Court never questioned 
the constitutional requirement or wisdom of the commission process, as 
had La Forest J., in dissent, in the 1997 decision.70 As well, none of the 
parties before the Court suggested that the commission process should 
be abolished for provincial court judges.71 Instead the parties focused 
exclusively on what is required to ensure that the commission process is 
effective. 
The Court’s commitment to the commission process is not 
surprising in light of its decision in Mackin, supra. In that case, two 
supernumerary provincial court judges challenged the government’s 
decision to abolish the office of supernumerary judge, which permitted 
judges over age 65 to take on a reduced (40 per cent) workload for full 
compensation, and to replace it with per diem sittings. The Court held 
that there was no breach of security of tenure, but found that the 
elimination of supernumerary status amounted to a change in judicial 
compensation because it amounted to the withdrawal of a future benefit 
for all currently sitting judges. The change was unconstitutional because 
the proposal was not put to the commission for a recommendation.72  
Had the court wished to limit the commission’s function, it could 
have done so in Mackin by concluding that the commission process was 
required only for direct review of salary and benefits but not for indirect 
changes to compensation incidental to changes to bona fide court 
reforms. The Court clearly viewed the commission process as an 
important requirement of judicial independence. Similarly, the decision 
to limit the scope of judicial review of government decisions in the 2005 
Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals does not reflect a 
reconsideration of the appropriateness of the commission requirement 
itself.  
One final potential effect of this decision is that judicial associations 
and governments are likely to focus more on the evidence adduced 
before the commission. The Court held that government decisions must 
                                                                                                            
70
 Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at paras. 302-304, 337, La Forest J. 
(dissenting). 
71
 Alberta and some government interveners argued unsuccessfully in the appeal in 
Bodner, supra, note 34, that a commission process was not constitutionally required for justices of 
the peace.  
72
 Mackin, supra, note 65, at para. 69. 
76 Supreme Court Law Review (2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
be responsive to the commission recommendations and, absent new 
facts or circumstances, cannot be based on facts or reasons that could 
have been put before the commission but were not.73 This means that the 
evidence and submissions before the commission will dictate any 
leeway that the government will have in responding to the 
recommendations. Although the experience across the country has been 
that commission processes were never taken lightly by either side, this 
new decision provides further incentive for ensuring that arguments and 
facts are fully canvassed. 
3. Unresolved Issues 
(a)  Developing an Ongoing Relationship  
The 1997 Provincial Judges Reference and 2005 Provincial Judges 
Compensation Appeals leave open the extent to which governments and 
the judiciary (or their representative associations) may communicate 
about judicial compensation, outside the commission inquiry process. In 
the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference, the Court was intent on avoiding 
negotiations over judicial compensation and, in particular, the potential 
apprehension of undue influence that might arise as a result of “horse-
trading” that typically forms part of collective bargaining.74 To do this, 
the Court decided to interpose the commission process between the 
judiciary and the government as an “institutional sieve” to provide a 
forum for the objective consideration of the appropriate level of judicial 
compensation without direct negotiations between the parties.75 
The resulting litigation over rejected compensation commission 
recommendations, however, presented a new problem. As the Court 
observed in its decision in the Provincial Judges Compensation 
Appeals, negotiation had been replaced by litigation and the objective of 
depoliticizing judicial/government relations was not achieved.76 The 
Court responded by making clear that this recourse will not result in 
government decisions being overturned, save in limited circumstances.  
                                                                                                            
73
 Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, supra, note 4, at paras. 36, 62, 103. 
74
 Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 188. 
75
 Id., at para. 189. 
76
 Provincial Judges Compensation Appeals, supra, note 4, at paras. 12, 43. 
(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) Judicial Independence Revisited 77 
Another possible avenue to diminish the need for litigation would 
be to revisit the strict limits placed on negotiations in the 1997 
Provincial Judges Reference. The ability to discuss issues respecting 
compensation informally might assist in depoliticizing relations. Most 
other compensation decisions involving payments from the public purse 
involve lengthy negotiations, mediations and ongoing consultations. The 
resulting agreement receives approval from both politicians and union 
or association members. The parties learn to work together, not just 
when bargaining a new collective agreement, but also during the life of 
the agreement.  
By contrast, the commission process for resolving judicial 
compensation disputes is typically formal, sporadic and confrontational. 
Lawyers typically represent both sides. The process resembles the 
adversarial nature of a trial or arbitration process, which is normally a 
course of last resort used only when negotiation and consensus building 
have failed. If the two sides were able to communicate each other’s 
concerns in a less formal and adversarial setting, focus on interest-based 
discussions and engage a mediator to help resolve issues, they may be 
able to narrow issues in dispute.  
The majority reasons in the 1997 Provincial Judges Reference 
appear, however, to create a disincentive for governments and the 
judiciary to seek agreement outside the adversarial commission process. 
The Court’s clearly stated concern that negotiation may give rise to a 
reasonable apprehension that judges’ interests in matters at stake in 
negotiations may compromise their impartiality77 would set a very low 
threshold if applied strictly. As La Forest J. observed in dissent, 
however, one would expect that “a reasonable person … would believe 
judges are made of sturdier stuff than this”.78  
On the other hand, some comments in the majority’s reasons in the 
Provincial Judges Reference suggest that consultation and discussion 
between government and judiciary may be permissible, provided both 
sides avoid hard-bargaining tactics that could cause a perception that the 
courts may be subject to undue influence in their decision-making. For 
instance, the majority appears to contemplate some degree of direct 
discussions in stating that the prohibition on negotiations “does not 
preclude expressions of concern or representations by chief justices and 
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chief judges, and organizations that represent judges, to governments 
regarding the adequacy of judicial remuneration”.79 The Court also 
expressly recommended consultation with the judiciary in designing 
commission processes.80 
In addition, in Ontario, the 1992 Commission Report was based in part 
on a joint review of the provincial judges’ pension plan. One of Ontario’s 
reasons for rejecting the Commission’s pension recommendations in its 
subsequent 1999 report was that no demographic changes had taken place 
since the joint recommendation was made and accepted. The Court 
accepted this reason as legitimate without making any negative comment 
on the collaborative process involving the joint submission.81 
The Alberta government and Alberta Provincial Judges Association 
also made a joint submission to the Alberta Judicial Compensation 
Commission during its 2000 inquiry. The parties made clear that the 
joint submission was provided “simply to assist the 2000 Commission in 
its work, and in full recognition and acknowledgement that, as required 
by Canadian constitutional law, the 2000 Commission must be an 
objective, independent, and effective body which has the power to make 
a recommendation at variance with a joint submission”.82 
Governments and judicial associations seeking to take a more 
collaborative approach to the determination of judicial compensation 
should nevertheless exercise caution. The majority in the Provincial 
Judges Reference was critical of the Manitoba government and, to some 
extent, the judicial association in that province, over the fact that they 
agreed to put a joint submission to the Commission. The Court’s concern, 
however, seems directed more to the apparent expectation, expressed in 
correspondence between the parties, that the commission would “rubber-
stamp” the proposal without conducting a hearing, than to the fact that a 
joint proposal to the commission was considered at all.83  
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(b) Spectrum of Judicial Independence Requirements 
Another issue not fully resolved in the Provincial Judges Compensation 
Appeals is the way in which the established principle that the essential 
requirements of judicial independence should be construed flexibly with 
respect to various courts and tribunals applies in practice. The Court 
applied the same standard to all the cases before it, even though one 
case dealt with justices of the peace.  
In the case of Bodner, one of the consolidated appeals, Alberta and 
some government interveners argued unsuccessfully that the principle of 
judicial independence did not require an independent, objective 
commission process for determining justices of the peace’s 
compensation. The Court rejected this argument and concluded that a 
commission was both legislatively and constitutionally required for 
Alberta’s justices of the peace. 84 
In other recent cases, however, the Court has affirmed the flexible 
application of judicial independence requirements. In Re Therrien, the 
Court confirmed that constitutional judicial independence principles 
applied flexibly in concluding that removal of a provincial court judge 
from office did not require a legislative address similar to the address of 
Parliament and the Senate required for removal of superior court judges: 
These essential conditions should instead respect that diversity and be 
construed flexibly. Accordingly, there should be no uniform standard 
imposed or specific legislative formula dictated as supposedly 
prevailing. It will be sufficient if the essence of these conditions is 
respected…85 
In Ell v. Alberta, the Court also referred to the principle that the 
mechanisms required to achieve minimum constitutional judicial 
independence requirements will vary.86 In that case, justices of the peace 
were effectively removed from office by the imposition of new 
minimum qualifications without any grandparenting provision for 
justices of the peace currently holding office. The Court confirmed that 
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requirements of judicial independence apply flexibly among various 
decision-makers in concluding that judicial independence had not been 
compromised: 
The level of security of tenure that is constitutionally required will 
depend upon the specific context of the court or tribunal. Superior 
court judges are removable only by a joint address of the House of 
Commons and the Senate, as stipulated by s. 99 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867. This level of tenure reflects the historical and modern 
position of superior courts as the core of Canada’s judicial structure 
and as the central guardians of the rule of law. Less rigorous 
conditions apply in the context of provincial courts, which are 
creatures of statute, but which nonetheless perform significant 
constitutional tasks.87 
The Court in Ell concluded that the requirement that judicial officers 
only be removed for cause cannot be applied as rigidly where removal 
occurs by legislative means.88 The Court found that the legislation in 
issue was part of a legislative measure that was “reasonably intended to 
further the interests that underlie the principle of judicial independence”, 
in particular public confidence in the administration of justice and the 
maintenance of a strong and independent judiciary.89 As a result, a 
reasonable and informed person would perceive the reforms to the office 
to strengthen, rather than diminish, the independence and qualifications 
of Alberta’s justices of the peace.90 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision in the 2005 Provincial Judges Compensation 
Appeals is likely to curb litigation respecting judicial compensation in 
the near future. It makes clear that decisions respecting judicial 
compensation affect the allocation of public funds, a matter properly 
within the purview of the provinces. The role of the commission is 
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confirmed, not as a body charged with determining the appropriate level 
of judicial compensation, but as a consultation and recommendation 
process designed to ensure that governments have independent and 
objective advice and give genuine consideration to the commission’s 
recommendations.  
The level of deference afforded governments is very high. Only 
where a government’s conduct or reasons reflect a failure to give 
consideration or be responsive to a commission’s recommendations will 
the Court set aside a recommendation. The fact that the remedy will 
likely be limited to returning the decision for reconsideration by 
government, and that judges may end up paying for both sides’ costs of 
litigation, will likely encourage associations representing the judiciary 
to exercise discipline in deciding whether to challenge decisions 
respecting their compensation in the courts. 
The effect of the decision is not limited to reducing litigation over 
judicial compensation. As well, the Court has signalled that the 
commission process, although only recommendatory, must nevertheless 
remain robust. Because the government’s response must deal with facts 
and arguments before the commission, the parties will have to ensure 
that all relevant facts and submissions are on the record.  
Finally, the decision does not address other related issues that may 
arise in the future. Specifically, it leaves open questions about the extent 
to which governments and the judiciary may engage in ongoing 
consultations in order to resolve compensation-related issues apart from 
the commission process. It also remains to be seen which elements of 
judicial independence apply to other decision makers that operate within 
the court system. 
 
 
 
